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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
FRED DEMMAN, .JR.,
Plaintiff-AzJ pell a 11 t,

-vs.-

Case No. 121:20

STAR BROADCASTING CO., and
LARRY -WILCOX,
Def ('ndants-R('s1J011de 11f s.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPI•:LLAN'l'S

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the Summary Judgment of the District
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable
Stewart M. Hansen, District .Judge.

NArruRE OF

CASE

This is a libPl and slander case.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants recriV('d snnmiary judgment.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court summary
judgment and a remand for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Defendant Larry Wilcox was a radio announcer
with KSXX which is a radio station of defendant Star
Broadcasting Company.
2. KSXX broadcasts telephone conversations between members of the public and the radio announcer.
3. There is a delay between the time a caller engages in conversation with the announcer and the time
when said conversation is broadcast. The delay is for
the purpose of allowing the announcer time to prevent tl1e
broadcasting and publication of defamatory statements
by pushing a reject button.
4. Plaintiff was a candidate for Commissioner on
the Salt L,ake City Commission.
5. On the day of election, defendant Larry
allowed the broadcasting of statements to the effect that:
The plaintiff was a procurer of fallen women, was
engaged in a practice of violating State Liquor laws,
and was a member of the "underworld."

G.

For purposes of the motion for summary judg-

nwnt and this appeal these statements ·were admitted to
he broadcast and were admitted to he intentionally broadcast and were admitted to be false.

POINT I
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A JURY TRIAL AS THERE
IS AN ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS ACTED WITH :l\IALICE.

The law of libel and slander has seen much development in the last decade. At common law it ·was sufficient
to impose liability if the defendant

uttered

or published a false statement concerning the plaintiff.
RPe

Prosser, Torts, 572-578 (2d ed). For purposes of the

motion for snmrnary judgment and this appeal the dPfrndant admitt('d the common law elPmPnts of defamation
-intentional pnhlication of a false statement coneerning
the ]>laintiff.
Vhth respect to persons characterized as "in the pnhlic light" eo111111on law elenwnts are no longer sufficient.
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There must be a showing of malice. See N.Y. Tirnes Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d, 686, 84 Sup. Ct.
710, 95 ALR 2d, 1412; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 13 L. Ed. 2d, 125 85 Snp. Ct. 209 (1964); Beckley
Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 19 L. Ed. 2d 248,
88 S. Ct. 197 (1967); Green Belt Coopera.tive Publishing
Association v. BrestlPr, 398 U.S. 6, 26 L. Ed. 2d, 6, 90
Sup. Ct. 1537 (1970); Monitor Patriot Co., ct al. v. Roy,
...... U.S. ------, 28 L. Ed. 2d, 35, 91 Sup. Ct. 621, 39 Law
Week 4264 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. et al. v. Damron,------ U.S. ______ , 28 L. Ed. 2d, 57, 91 Sup. Ct. 628 39 L.W.
4268 (1971); Tirnc, Inc. v. Pate, 397 U.S. 1062, 28 L. Ed.
2d, ---- 91 Sup. Ct. 633, 39 L.W. 4270 (1971). No longer is
malice defined as a feeling of ill-will, nor will malice be
inferred from the contents of the publication as at common law. See 50 Am. ,Tur. 2d, 978-980, Libel and Slander
Section 454. Under present Supreme Court cases, malice
can only be sho,\7J1 by the publication of a false statement
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disrega.rd
of the truth. Garrison v. Loitisia11.a, sitpra; Beckley
Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, supra; Green Belt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Brestler, snvra; 1Jl onitor
Patriot Co., et al. v. Roy, supra; Ooala Star-Banner Co.,
et al. v. Darnron, sitpra; Time, Inc.

1;.

Pate, supra.

The United States Supreme Conrt has held th::iJ the
requirement of a finding of malice is necessitated by

t]1e

first amendment which guarantePs freedom of s11eech
and press, Ibid. However, if the publication is made with
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knowledge of the falsity or with reckh•ss disregard of the
truth, the protections of the First A11wndment do not
apply in a civil action for libel and slander. Beckley
Neu,spapcr Corp. v. Hanks, supra; Green Belt Coo1wrntive Publishing Association v. Brestler, supra; lllo11itor
Patriot Co., et al. v. Roy, supra; Ocala Star-Banner Co.,
et al. 1!. Da111ro11, supra; Time, Inc. v. Pate, s11pra.
The protection afforded speech and press \\·as gradually extended from 1mblicatiom; and utterances defaming
public officers to all pt>rsons coming into the public light,
including candidates for office. Iliirl. The Utah statutes
are in accord with the federal Imm. Section 45-2-5 [!tali
Corle Ann. (Repl. Vol. 1970) provides that a hrnadcasting
station will not be liable for defamation on account of
having originatPd or broadcast a proµ:ram for discussion
of controvt•rsial or other subjects in thP alrnPnee of proof
of actual malice on tlw part of the owner or operator.
In the present case, summary judgment was granted
against the plainiff. Plaintiff alleged all of the common
law dcments prerequisifr to a dt>famation action togeth(•r
with an allegation of malice. (See paragraph 8 or the
eornplaint.) For purposes of the surnman· judgnwnt motion, the defendant stipulated that they had intentional!;·
broadcast false statements cone(•rning the plaintiff. They
argued, however, that from th<> record there could he no
gem1mP

of fact as to nw.lie<>. The defendants sup-

(j

ported this motion for summary jndgment with a transcript of the broadcast itself. The trial court agreed and
granted summary judgment.
There can he no c1uestion that the issue of malicP
is normally a jury question. New York Times v. Sullivan,
s11.pm; TVa.shington Post v. Keogh 125 App. B.C. 32, 3G5
F.2d 965, 20 ALR 3d, 972. However, it is equally :settled
that summary judgment may be· granted in a proper
case where there is no issue of fact. In Washington Post
v. Keogh, supra, a lihel case, the court stated:

A motion for summary j1<dgment shonld

}w

granted ·when• it is shown that no genuine issiw
of material fact exists and that the movement i:s
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Jn
deciding 1vl1etlwr a genuine issue of fact is
in any case, a nnmher of general considerati011s
are relevant. First, the right to a trial h,\' a jm::
is at stakl', so courts nrnst lw ever cardnl to µ;rant
summary judgment only when no issrn• of fact i.
controverted or
upon a choice lwt"'<)en ]i<'l'rnissihle inferences from nndispntecl Pvid(·nce. (:c''.'
Pierce 1). Ford Jllotor Co., 4 Cir. !90 F'.
Cert denied ;342 F.8. 887. 72 i ;np. Ct. 178, 9<i L.
Ed. 2d GGG (1951 ). The need for
has giwn
to valid ge1wrnlizatiom.: lmt
jnd[;·ment nrnst he deniNl 1d1en
is 'donht whctl1er
an issne of fact has hePn rnisecl, and that
judgment is not
\Yl'.·n. lh·
raised concerns n snl1j0din· stat0 of llllJ'(:.'
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In fop lVusl1in.r;tm1 Jio.,·t r. K<'o.r;h. s11pra, tht> (kl(·rnlnnts supportPd th('ir motion for srnimun;,· jndgment \1·itl1
arf:<hffits that tlH· defendant and th<'il' employePs ha<1
tak(•n ('an' to r<>ad the defamatory pnhli('atior:s and hnd

no reason to lwlieve or (•viclen('e causing tlwm to susped
that the information was fabP. TlH· plaintiff did
lmt tlw avC'nnents. 'l'he eourt

iJ01

n·-

Slllil!Uary judgrnen l

holding, "it is undisvutecl that no issrn' of fact Pxists l!Pl'<'
as to the publication with actual knowl<•clgP of falsit<'
and "infen'nce of reckl<"ss1wss from pnhlicaiions should
110

more he pennitt('d in mw ca:w than thP oth(•r."
In the vresent case. dr>f Pndants' onl;• support for till·

motion for 8lmm1ary judgment was tlw tran;;eript of !lw
hroadca8t. Plaintiff argn('S that such franseript hard!_,.
sustains thE:> "hnrdE:>n of removing actual malieP from t!w
case." See Tagau:a Publishing Co., 427 P. 2d 79 (Ha\rnii)

(19G8). \Vhile malice may no longer he infern•d from tlH·
publication itself,

S<'P

Ncio rurk Times I'ulJ!islii1,'.rf Co. /'.

Fi11Uivan, s11pra, no court has 11Plcl that
:wnce of malicP from the pnhlication.

can i11f1•r aL'l'hat is

what the defendants attempted to do on th<> mot;on for
summary jnclgnwnt when tli<>ir

snp:)()rt wns tlll'

trnnsrript of the hroacleast.

'I1o oppose tlw motion for snmrnar>- jndgmPnt, plaintiff mov<'d to pnlili8h tlH' dupositions of \\·itiw:-:ses and

partiPs. Plaintiff, in liis

it ion, aw rs

th<• d:•-

fendants must have known of the falsity of tlw broadcast,
therefore, satisfying the tests of actual malice. On page
9 of plaintiff's deposition, he swore:

It had to be planned. lt had to he
with maliciousness because it ·was called at 2 :30
in the afternoon, the day of election. Two-thfrty
in the afternoon approximately was the tinw it
was called and nobody had a chance to ans1n•r,
where nobody had a diance to say auything in my
defense.
And at page 19, tlw l)laintiff stated, nndPr oath:

vV ell, of
I think the tone of the whole
conversation with Mr. Wilcox and this unknown
caller defamed me. Tlw inferences in tlwir voices,
the laughing, it was maliciously don<'.
but nobody will ever know tlw
and what
this did to my life, ·what it did to my wifr, to
brothers that are doctor:", to
hrotlwr that is a
counselor at high school, to Ill)' sister-in-law "·110
is the supervisor of all business in the school system. Nobody "·ill ever know what it did to ou1·
family.
Again, at page 24 and 2:> tiw Pxamination went on:
Q. Now, I lrnm\· you rel)· upon the Ianght<' ..
in his voice and the wa)· it WflS presPnted and th0
timincr
,..., of some evidence of this malict>. ·what oth11r
fads, if any, do yon know of that indicate rnalicr
to you?
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A. \Vell, why didn't he use the sevt>n s<'cond
delay if his intention wasn't to hurt me aml to
destroy nw "? 'J'here is a seven second delay faeto r
there. He could
put th<:> man off the air, hut
lie let him go on. lfo lauglwd and he earriPcl on
and his infrr<:>nces to tlw public came over that lw
kn0w this was all true. 'I'he inf('l'Pnce in his voi('P
and the laughter and everything that was inrnlv<>d,
the manner of the conversation, that it had to lH·
planned and he let it go on h!:'cause he doPs have
this seven s<:>cond delay he could have tak<>n tlH·
man off th(• air. If it wasn't do110 with mali('l'
and an attempt to destroy my lifo, to dPstro:· my
public image, why didn't lw nsP the SPVPn serond
delay?
On pages 27 and 28 of the deposition, the examination went as follows:

Q. Do you state in your complaint that \Yil-

cox acted with reckless diRregard of tlt0 truth, ls
that based primarily on thP fact lw didn't US!' th<•
seven second delay?

:;\fr. Leed:·: Objection, that calls for a Jpgal
conclusion as to what rPeli:!Pss disregard of th<'
truth means.

Q.

Do

:·011

HndPrstaml 1d1at ii. Jll('ans !

Thfr. LPc·dY: I still ohjPct. I mn not ewn sur0
I understand 1\·hat it rn<'ans. Tht>n• has lwPn a lot
of cases on it in the recPnt past.
0
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Q. Well, could you tell us if you know what
facts you rely on to etsablish that, even if yon
don't know what it is?

Mr. Leedy: I can tell you the facts I rely
on if it helps you, Bryce. If you are talking about
the theory of our law suit.
:Mr. Roe: Well, go ahead.
Mr. Leedy: The statements are obviously
false. There was no investigation made to determine the truth of the statements before they
were made. He did fail to use the seven second
delay. He indicated that he had made no investigation whatsoever concerning the truth of those
statements before letting them be broadcast and
he knew they were damaging to Fred Demman
at the time he broadcast them.
Mr. Roe: Is that from his deposition?
Mr. Leedy: Right.
On page 32, the plaintiff testified in response to a
question:
Q. And it is from those facts that you conclude 1that there was malice, actual malice on the
part of Mr. -Wilcox?

A. There are no facts, it was malice. The
facts are there. Malice is there. There is no question that I should say.

11

On page 36, the examination went as follows:
Q. Now you have been concentrating mainly
on the broadcast between Wilcox and the caller
who defamed you, but you have had occasion to
read the transcript of the woman who called in
subsequent to the caller \vho defamed you and
heard dialogue with 'Wilcox, have you now.?

A.

Yes.

Q. And there are portions of that transcript
are there not which would also tend to show :Jlr.
malice?
A. Oh. Yes, certainly, certainly. I
that anybody listened to her call, she knPw that
he was trying to destroy me and she knew in her
opinion that it was very unfair, unjust and uncalled for a way to campaign or destroy a man's
life and I think she inferred in that tram;cript that
the man's destroying me.

Q.

And in that transcript Wilcox stated to
the woman that he agrt>ed with tlw callt>r, did hcnot?
A.

Yes.

Q. And from that particular statement, yon
would infer malice on the part of "Tilcox, would

not?
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A.

Thats right. Yes.

The defendant, himself, in his deposition, swore:
In response to the question, ''at the time the
statements were made, you indicated that you had
no knowledge that they were trne, is that correct?
A.

1-'hat's correct.

This case is clearly distinguishable from the Washing ton Post case where the defendants averred, under
oath, that they had no knowledge of the
of the
statement and the plaintiff, on motion for summary judgment, did not controvert those, averments. In such a case,
summary judgment may be correct; however, in the instant case, the plaintiff swore under oath Hiat there had
to be malice and the defendant testified that he had no
knowledge that the statements were true when he allowed
them to be broadcast. That has to raise an issue of fact
for the jury to decide. If the defendant's theory is correct, then the only time an action for libel or slander will
lie is when the defendant admits the malice. In the
present case, there is no doubt that the defendant had not
admitted the malice but such may be inferrPd from:
(1)

The failure to use the fwven second ck lay button

to reject the broadcast;
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(2) The defendant's statement that he allowed the
broadcast but did not know whether the ddamalory
statements of the plaintiff were
(3) The defendant laughed when the defamatory
::;tatements were made;
(4) The defendant stated over the air that he
agreed with the caller;
( 5)

The defendant made no effort to investigate tlw

truth of the statements prior to broadcasting them.

It certainly appears in the present case that the dt>fendant has not carried its burden of removing any genuine issue of fact concerning actual malice. See Tagawa

Piihlishing Co., 427, P.D. 79 (Hawaii 1968). 'l'he case
should be remanded and the jury should be allo"·ed to
determine whether or not the defendant:,; acted with
actual malice.
POINT II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HA VE BEEN
GRANTED ON THE THEORY THAT THE LIBELOUS STATE
MENTS WERE MADE ON BEHALF OF A CANDIDATE FOR
PUBLIC OFFICE.
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Section '15-2-5 Utah Code A11n. (Repl. Vol. 1970) provides:

"In no event, however, shall any such owner or

operator be held liable for any damages for any defamatory statement uttered over the facilities of such station
or network by or on behalf of any candidate for public
office." Defendants moved for smmnary judgment asserting or contending that the defamatory statements were
made on behalf of a candidate for public office, apparently the plaintiff's opponent.

All of the evidence shows that neither the plaintiff
nor the defendants knew who the caller was. Therefore,
it is impossible to state that the statements were made
on behalf of the cadidate opposing the plaintiff in the
election for City Commission. The fact that the slander
:;;tatenwnts incidPntally henefitted Mr. Demman's opponent does not necessarily make the statements made on
his behalf. For example, if an attorney is slandered, all
other attorneys may lw incidentally hem-frtted by tlw
fact that a potential client may not go to the defamed
attorney, but to other attorneys. However, that does not
necessarily mean that the person uttering the slander
was acting on behalf of the other attorneys. Almost every
slander incidentally benefits others, however, that does
not necessarily mean that the slander was made on behalf
of the others.
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POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ALLOWED A JURY
TRIAL ON HIS CONTENTION THAT THE DEFENDANT
WAS NEGLIGENT.

In paragraph 9 of plaintiff's complaint, he alleges:
Star Broadcasting Co. failed to exercise due
care in the hiring and/or training of defendant
Larry -Wilcox and/or in its method of programming for preventing defamatory broadcasting;
the foreseeable results of which would lw tht>
broadcasting of defamator:· matt<>rs; all or any
one of which proximately canst><l the broadcasting
of the mattNs (alleged to he lihPlons of plaintiff).
Section 45-2-7 Utah Code Ann. Repl. Vol. 5 (a) 1970
provides:
Nor shall anything in this act be constnwd to
relieve any person, firm, or corporation owning
or operating a radio or tPlevision broadcasting
station or network from liabilit;.· under the law
of slander, libel, or defamation on the account of
any broadcast prepared or made hy any snC'li
person, firm, corporation or by any officer or
t-mployeP thereof in the C'onrse of his 1:'!11Jllo;.·nH•nt.
In no event, howPver, shall any such pPrson, firm
or corporation he liable for nn;.· damagt>s for any
defamatory statement or act pnhlish<>d or ntten•rl
in or as a· part of ... sound broadcast
it
shall he all<>ged and provf'd hy the eomplammg

1G

party that such person, firm or corporation has
failed to exercise due care to prevent the publication or utterance of such statement or act in such
broadcast.
There is no question that the complaining party, the
plaintiff, has alleged the failure to exercise due care.
The defendant has not controverted these allegations
except by way of answer. Therefore, there appears
to be a genuine issue of fact and a trial by jury should
result.
CONCLUSIONS
There are issues of fact and plaintiff is entitled to a
trial by jury. This case should be reversed and remanded
for a trial.
Respe0tfully submitted,
RICHARD J. LEEDY, of
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bottum & Leedy

